Pennsylvania Supreme Court Declines to Ban Police Deception in Interrogations: Commonwealth v. Foster, 332 A.3d 1187 (Pa. 2025)
Sept. 6, 2025
Introduction
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently issued a significant decision in Commonwealth v. Foster, 332 A.3d 1187 (Pa. 2025), addressing the use of deception in police interrogations and the voluntariness of a defendant’s statement under the Fifth Amendment. At issue was whether a detective’s misrepresentation—telling a suspect he was “not a suspect” despite having already obtained warrants for his DNA—rendered the defendant’s statement involuntary per se.
The Court ultimately declined to adopt a bright-line prohibition against such deception. Instead, it reaffirmed the longstanding rule that voluntariness is determined under the totality of the circumstances test, and concluded that Foster’s statement was admissible.
Factual Background
The case arose from a sexual assault investigation in which Detective Sellers identified Foster as a potential suspect after learning he was alone with the alleged victim during part of the evening in question. Seeking to rule him in or out, Sellers obtained a warrant for Foster’s DNA.
Foster initially failed to appear for an interview, prompting the detective to apply for a second DNA warrant after the first expired. Eventually, Foster voluntarily came to the police station on November 2, 2020. He was not restrained, allowed to use his phone, and told that he was free to leave.
At the outset of the interview, Detective Sellers told Foster he was “not a suspect,” even though the detective had already secured warrants to test Foster’s DNA. The interview lasted roughly twenty minutes. Sellers’ demeanor was described as non-coercive and professional. Foster denied involvement and voluntarily consented to provide a buccal swab for DNA testing. Later results showed his DNA did not match the sample recovered from the victim.
Procedural History
Foster moved to suppress his statements, arguing they were involuntary because of the detective’s deliberate deception. The suppression court agreed, finding that Sellers’ misrepresentation that Foster was not a suspect undermined Foster’s capacity for self-determination.
The Commonwealth appealed, contending that the suppression court had improperly focused on a single factor instead of applying the full totality of the circumstances test. The Superior Court reversed, holding the statement voluntary. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to resolve whether misrepresentations of suspect status render a statement involuntary as a matter of law.
Foster’s Argument
Foster argued that the detective’s repeated assurances that he was not a suspect critically impaired his ability to make a free and unconstrained choice about whether to speak. By reframing the interview as a routine witness conversation, Sellers allegedly deprived Foster of the awareness necessary to protect his own interests.
Foster urged the Court to establish a bright-line rule prohibiting police from lying about suspect status during interrogations. He contended that such a rule would reduce the risk of false confessions, strengthen the legitimacy of the justice system, and align Pennsylvania with emerging reforms in other states that restrict or prohibit police deception—particularly with juveniles.
The Pennsylvania Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (PACDL), appearing as amicus, strongly supported Foster. Their brief relied on recent psychological and empirical studies demonstrating the connection between deceptive interrogation tactics and false confessions. PACDL highlighted examples of wrongful convictions nationwide that stemmed from deception and encouraged the Court to abandon its tolerance for such practices.
The Commonwealth’s Position
The Commonwealth responded that the suppression court erred by treating the misrepresentation as dispositive. The proper standard is a holistic evaluation of whether the interrogation was so coercive as to overbear the defendant’s will. Here, every other factor favored voluntariness:
Foster came voluntarily to the station.
He was not in custody and not restrained.
He was permitted to use his cell phone.
The interview was brief, professional, and non-confrontational.
Foster was an adult of sound mind, with no evident mental or psychological impairments.
The Commonwealth also emphasized that Sellers did not act in bad faith. Rather, he misunderstood Foster’s legal status when balancing his role as an investigator seeking DNA to rule suspects in or out. Importantly, Foster never confessed; he denied involvement, and DNA evidence ultimately proved him truthful in that denial.
The Court’s Analysis
Totality of the Circumstances Standard
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that voluntariness of statements is governed by the totality of the circumstances test under both state and federal constitutional law. This test examines all surrounding facts, including:
The defendant’s custodial status
Whether restraints were used
The length and tone of the interview
The presence of coercive or deceptive tactics
The defendant’s age, experience, and understanding
The Court expressly rejected Foster’s reliance on a “but-for” test, which asks whether the defendant would have made the statement absent the misrepresentation. Pennsylvania precedent, including Commonwealth v. Nester and Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, has consistently held that voluntariness depends not on but-for causation, but on whether the tactics deprived the defendant of free will.
Application to Foster
The Court acknowledged that Detective Sellers’ misrepresentation was “flat-out wrong” but emphasized that it was not malicious or manipulative. The suppression court itself noted that Sellers appeared to act in good faith, albeit under a misunderstanding of Foster’s role.
Examining the circumstances as a whole, the Court found:
Foster voluntarily appeared for the interview.
He was not restrained and could have left at any time.
He was allowed to use his phone and was in control of his environment.
The interview was brief, polite, and non-confrontational.
Foster was 37 years old and demonstrated full comprehension.
While the Court did not condone the misrepresentation, it concluded that this single factor did not outweigh the overwhelming indicators of voluntariness.
Holding
The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision and held that Foster’s statement was voluntary. The suppression court erred by focusing exclusively on the misrepresentation rather than conducting a full totality analysis.
The Court declined to adopt a bright-line rule prohibiting deception, noting that neither Pennsylvania nor the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized such a per se rule. Misrepresentations are only problematic when they are so coercive that they overbear a suspect’s will or offend fundamental notions of fairness.
Significance
This decision reaffirms the broad discretion police have to use some level of deception during interrogations in Pennsylvania. While the Court acknowledged the concerns raised by defense advocates and social science research, it ultimately left intact a pragmatic, case-by-case approach.
For defense attorneys, Foster underscores the difficulty of winning suppression motions based solely on deception absent clear coercion or involuntariness. Going forward:
Defense counsel must build suppression arguments by emphasizing multiple coercive factors, not just misrepresentation.
Courts remain hesitant to suppress statements where defendants appear to understand the context, voluntarily engage, and are not in custody.
Advocates for reform may now turn to the legislature, as other states have, to impose categorical bans on police deception.
Conclusion
Commonwealth v. Foster, 332 A.3d 1187 (Pa. 2025), reflects the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s continued reliance on the totality of the circumstances test in determining voluntariness of statements. Although the Court recognized the troubling nature of deceptive interrogation tactics, it declined to draw a bright line prohibiting police from minimizing a suspect’s status.
For now, Pennsylvania remains among the majority of jurisdictions that tolerate limited police deception, so long as it does not rise to the level of coercion.